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Reengineering and reorganizing new product processes and structures is an unending
endeavor,...
--Robert G. Cooper and Elko J. Kleinschmidt (1995), "Benchmarking the Firm's Critical Success
Factors in New Product Development"
The world can doubtless never be well known by theory: practice is absolutely necessary; but
surely it is of great use to a young man, before he sets out for that country, full of mazes,
windings, and turnings, to have at least a general map of it, made by some experienced
traveller.
--Lord Chesterfield (1749), The Letters of the Earl of Chesterfield to His Son
A junior faculty member came to me seeking advice on how to earn tenure. He had gone to the
formal modelers who suggested that he collect some data, run a few regressions, and knock out
a few empirical papers. Then he would have breathing room for the (clearly) more difficult
theoretical papers. The empiricists also gave him excellent career advice. They suggested he
write down a few equations, take some derivatives, and publish a few quick theoretical papers.
That would give him the breathing room to do the (clearly) more difficult empirical papers.
They are both right and they are both wrong.
Personally I was never able to set forth a theory without spending time in the field. It's amazing
how much insight one can obtain from a manager who is facing a difficult (and scientifically
interesting) problem. Nor was I ever able to make sense of field observations without spending
considerable time developing an underlying theory to explain both the expected and the
unexpected results. All too often the field observations gave anomalous results that challenged
many an a priori expectation. Only after many false starts did theories crystalize and obvious
answers become obvious.
I have been given the opportunity today to reflect upon my attempts to study product
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development. I have chosen to begin this paper with two quotes. Because the Converse
announcement cites the work that I have done with Glen Urban on new product development,
I have chosen the first quote to epitomize the challenge and excitement of product development.
We have made progress, but the road is never ending. Perhaps the future will be one of
continuing improvement, but I am hopeful someone will use globalization, information ubiquity,
or today's astounding computer power to effect a paradigm shift in the way we develop new
products. The second quote illustrates the interplay of experience and conceptual models.
Neither approach is effective without the other.
I have chosen to focus this essay on the second theme rather than the first. I need not convince
you of the importance of product development. We all accept that it is critical to growth and
profitability. Nor do I need to convince you of the challenges that remain in the study of
product development. They are many and varied. On the other hand it is rare that I am given
the opportunity to muse upon the methods by which I study product development. I take that
opportunity here.
This essay is neither prescriptive nor evangelical. I describe here only what has worked
for me. I have found eclecticism productive, but I am happy to acknowledge that the
concentration of effort is, for some, a more effective strategy.
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Problem-Driven Theory and Theory-Driven Solutions
Experience alone, without theory, teaches management nothing about what to do to improve
quality and competitive position, nor how to do it.
-- W. Edwards Deming (1982), Out of the Crisis
This project began with a simple question.
-- Robert Axelrod (1984), The Evolution of Cooperation
I have read many essays by marketing scholars. Some argue that marketing is a science;
others that it is an application of other social sciences. Some say simply that "we solve
problems." For example, Bob Klein of Applied Marketing Science, Inc. sees his company's
core competence as using marketing science to sell "solved problems." Gary Lilien of
Pennsylvania State University has coined the term "marketing engineering" to reflect the use of
marketing science to solve real problems. My own approach has been one of engineering
science -- the study of phenomena and methods that enable us to solve relevant problems.
In 1984 Robert Axelrod published his influential book on the evolution of cooperation.
This text, and a paper with William Hamilton, introduced a new paradigm of thought that has
influenced scientists in fields as diverse as biology, political science, economics, and marketing.
Prof. Axelrod began with a simple question drawn from his experience in political science. --
"When should people cooperate?" He asked scientists in a variety of fields to submit their
solutions and played them one against the other in a simple tournament. Surprisingly, strategies
that resulted from very sophisticated (but not empirically-driven) theory were beaten by simple
strategies drawn from experience. Had he simply described the outcomes, the tournament would
have had little impact. However, faced with unexpected results, Axelrod reinterpreted game
theory and proposed that we examine properties of strategies rather than strategies and examine
only those properties that have survived evolution. He then completed the loop and used the
new theory to re-examine both social and natural phenomena. Even the influential ethologist,
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Richard Dawkins, acknowledges the impact of Axelrod's work. Axelrod succeeded because his
theory was problem-driven and, subsequently, his solutions were theory-driven.
Personally, I have found it much easier to formulate theories if I understand the problem.
My work on defensive strategies with Steve Shugan (1983) was driven by the observation that,
in the late 1970s, new-product pretest market models such as Assessor were used more often by
incumbents than by the pioneers. Steve and I spent many an hour trying to understand how
incumbents used this information, what new information they needed, and how we might collect
that information. The paper as published contains no empirical data, but it was the result of
field experience.
Subsequently the theory led to an engineering model (with Steve Gaskin's help, 1984).
The model enhanced the effectiveness of pretest market models and led to valuable managerial
insights. The application was made possible by the theory.
Many papers on defensive strategy have been written since. Some have confirmed our
initial model, some of have extended it, and some have challenged it. In parallel the empirical
applications have strengthened the model. The model has been "matricized" and "logitized" to
account for the heterogeneity of consumer perceptions; practitioners have added brand-specific
constants to account for inertia and unmeasured variables; and competitive effects have been
internalized. Over the last 15 years it has been the interplay of data and theory that has enabled
the model to survive.
I can cite many personal examples such as my work with Birger Wernerfelt and Duncan
Simester (1994) where we studied customer satisfaction systems at a variety of firms in order
to understand why firms would measure customer satisfaction in the first place. The theories
in that paper, which drew upon published work in agency theory, led us to a different
perspective on the use of customer satisfaction. Another example is a theory of how consumers
search for information. This research evolved from an attempt (with Glen Urban, John Roberts,
and Bruce Weinberg) to build a prelaunch forecasting system for General Motors.
In each case the theory was driven by the problem and the solution was driven by the
theory. It was hard to say where one started and the other ended.
Throughout the history of science there are many great examples of problem-driven
theory. For example, Louis Pasteur's was attempting to help French wine growers to keep their
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wine from souring when he discovered Pasteurization and, subsequently, the germ theory of
disease. In turn, the germ theory of disease led to many great advances in medical science.
Even the Panama Canal owes its success, in part, to the efforts of Walter Reed to wipe out
Yellow Fever among the workers. However, not all great problems lead to productive theory.
Sir Isaac Newton spend considerable effort on alchemy and the transmutation of metals. We
have yet to find an economical way to turn lead into gold.
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The Revolution Came
In this essay I hope to persuade you that the revolution is coming. It will be resisted, but it will
come. My thesis is not normative, but predictive.
John Hauser (1985), "The Coming Revolution in Marketing
Theory"
In 1984 the Harvard Business School held a colloquium on the coming impact of the
information age. We all made predictions and many of them came or are coming true (for
example read Robert Buzzell's opening description of the office of 1995). By drawing an
analogy to Kuhn's (1970) history of science, I felt that the explosion of marketing data would
lead to the growth of mathematical theory in marketing. I felt that this would change the
paradigms in many areas of marketing thought.
In 1996 it is common to see papers using formal mathematical methods to address
marketing problems. And, there have been some major successes. I cite here two. There are
many others.
In the early 1980s two teams were formulating theories to guide the study of marketing
channels -- the Carnegie team of Richard Staelin and Timothy McGuire (1982) and the Chicago
team of Abel Jeuland and Steven Shugan (1983). At the time there was an extensive literature
describing channel behavior, documenting how power and dependency relationships form, and
suggesting how one might manage channel conflict. Both teams were aware of this literature.
However, each team, in its own way, asked the more fundamental question of whether the
structure of the channel was the underlying force that led to conflict. The answer, that we now
accept, is "yes, structure is extremely important." Among other things, the Jeuland and Shugan
paper highlighted why it is difficult to coordinate a channel and the McGuire and Staelin paper
highlighted why the order of decision making is important. Although both groups were
influenced by the economic theory of the time, but both groups drew upon their understanding
of channel phenomena to develop a marketing theory. These theories, and their subsequent
progeny, are now taught routinely in MBA programs and have made it into the standard texts.
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More importantly they have directed subsequent scientific investigation and have led to real
managerial insights. Today's papers use more complicated mathematics to extend the early
work, but the ideas began their germination with these papers.
Also in the early 1980s, an MIT team of John Little and Peter Guadagni (1983) were
working on a new set of methodologies to describe and predict consumer response to package-
good marketing strategies. The explosion in data made possible by coordinated supermarket
scanners compelled this development, but Guadagni and Little took an approach that was far
from obvious. Rather than continuing the tradition of aggregate models, these authors developed
a series of models that were based on the behavior of individual families. In developing their
models they made a critical decision that later proved prophetic -- in addition to control variables
they included a family-specific variable, called "loyalty," which changed over time (non-
stationarity) and included the effects of family differences (heterogeneity) and past purchases
(state dependence). The model has held up well. It's been improved with new methods, such
as probit analysis, and the effects of non-stationarity, heterogeneity, and state-dependence have
been studied with increasingly sophisticated methods. But the basic ideas remain. Now that the
models are well-accepted and well-calibrated researchers are able to model the effects of
competition (endogeneity) to the extent that they are not confounded by non-stationarity,
heterogeneity, and state-dependence. The most promising approach is by a team of
Northwestern University researchers (Dipak Jain, Mohanbir Sawhney, and their students) who,
with a paradigm shift driven by their application to high-definition television, are combining
direct measures of competitive reaction with revealed preference estimates of consumer behavior.
I expect the revolution in theory to continue and that it will be driven by researchers
attempting to solve the challenges of complex products, global markets, global supply chains,
instantaneous information, abundant information, and electronic markets. However, I do not
believe, nor have I ever believed, that theory alone will consummate the revolution.
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Why I Both Love and Hate Theory
I find the prospect (of signalling theories) rather worrying, because it means that theories of
almost limitless craziness can no longer be ruled out on common sense grounds. If we observe
an animal doing something really silly, like standing on its head instead on running away from
a lion, it may be doing it in order to show off to a female. It may even be showing off to the
lion, "I am such a high-quality animal you would be wasting your time trying to catch me. 
Richard Dawkins (1976), The Selfish Gene (from 1989
update notes)
But no matter how crazy I think it something is, natural selection may have other ideas.
Richard Dawkins (1976), The Selfish Gene (from 1989
update notes)
Theory is a two-edged sword. On one hand it provides a parsimonious chronicle of
observations, a shared language (and values), and tremendous insight into practical problems.
On the other hand it is tempting to put too much faith in a theory's assertions even if they
conflict with our experience.
We must, at all times, remember that a theory is but a model, an abstraction of the real
world. Those who introduced the theory had as their purpose to explain a set of observations
that could not be otherwise explained. Or, which could not be explained with the same
parsimony. It is likely that they made certain simplifications ignoring some phenomena to
concentrate on those that were critical to their needs. They may have made arbitrary decisions
(this variable, this function, that measure); there may have been other details that were just as
reasonable. A theory is reasonable if it provides insight and fits the data reasonably well. But
theory is not gospel.
Dawkins refers to the signalling theories that were developed in the early 1970s by
ethologists (e.g., Zahavi 1975) and by economists (e.g., Spence 1973). In each case one party
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knows something important that the other does not. In Dawkins' case a gazelle knows that it
is difficult to catch but the lion does not. The gazelle seemingly puts its life at risk by jumping
in front of the lion to demonstrate its strength and stamina. If the lion recognizes the signal, the
lion prefers to chase another (weaker) gazelle. Furthermore, because signalling is costly to a
gazelle, the equilibrium strategy for all gazelles is to signal honestly. In marketing these
concepts have been applied to pricing, promotion, advertising, and other marketing actions. (In
fact, Dawkins uses the word "advertising" to describe his gazelles.)
However, the natural selection analogy also provides caution. First, all animals do not
signal -- there are other evolutionary mechanisms that enhance an animal's survival probabilities.
Second, even when signalling might be an explanation, there may be more to the story. Birds
cry out to members of their flock that danger is approaching. At first this appears to be a pure
signalling model. But the acoustic properties of the alarm calls of birds are such that a predator
would have difficulty locating the alarm-giving bird. There are other, better, explanations for
bird alarms including the argument that the alarm-giving bird is better off if the flock flies off
together (thus reducing the odds of being singled out). See Dawkins (1989, p. 168-171). Third,
the effectiveness of the signalling argument (for gazelles) depends upon the strategies that one
allows the gazelle to adopt. One must allow "a choice from a continuous range of strategies"
(Dawkins 1989, p. 312).
What we can draw from the natural selection analogy is that signalling theories might or
might not apply to marketing phenomena. Firms might advertise ("bum money in public")
simply as a signal that they have much at stake and it is in their best interests to provide a high
quality product. On the other hand, firms might find that advertising makes customers aware
of products, communicates information about product attributes, and/or creates a positive image
for the brand. Signalling theory provides one possible explanation, but it may not be the only
explanation nor the most compelling.
Dawkins' first quote cautions that almost any observation is consistent with a signalling
theory. His second quote cautions that we can should not rule out arbitrarily potential signalling
explanations. Rather we must re-examine all explanations both from the perspective of common
sense and from the consistency of signalling with other facts relevant to the phenomena.
Occam's razor is a puissant tool.
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Dawkins refers to signalling theories, but the same cautions apply to almost all theories.
In the past twenty years I have used or proposed many a theory. I cringe at the thought that
these theories would be used without checking their consistency with real phenomena.
My other love-hate relationship with theory concerns the "stylized fact." I have found
the stylized fact to be a very powerful mechanism. Stylized facts allow one to abstract the
essential features of complex phenomena so that the phenomena might be modeled. But stylized
facts are not true universally, nor do they tell the entire story. As someone once said, "the
plural of anecdote is not data." A good theoretician sees one example, abstracts a stylized fact,
and produces a model to explain that fact. This is a valuable exercise in hypothesis generation.
If the next steps include testing the universality of the stylized fact and testing the completeness
of the explanation, then I am comfortable. But, alas, I have seen many examples where either
the stylized fact proves to be a special case or the abstraction misses relevant phenomena.
Unfortunately the sociology of the field appears to be such that these stylized-fact papers are
quoted as if they were an empirical demonstration of the veracity of the phenomena. The
stylized fact and the explanation take on the role of universal truths and become grounds for
rejecting any paper that challenges them. My only defense has been to attempt to read the
original papers and decide for myself.
In the end theory illuminates empirical research, but early on I found that I could not be
an effective researcher if I only developed theories.
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Do the Returns from Field Research Justify the Investment?
In confronting the enormous complexity of human behavior, the investigator has two choices.
he can severely simplify the phenomena under study and base all of his conclusions on this
simplified model. Or he can attempt to grapple with all the complexities simultaneously, hoping
for an inspired solution. Each approach has its limitations, the first one suffering from sterility
and the second from hopelessness.
Philip Kotler in the Foreword to Green and Wind (1973)
Multiattribute Decisions in Marketing.
Every reader in Spaceland will easily understand that my mysterious Guest was speaking the
language of truth and even of simplicity. But to me, proficient though I was in Flatland
Mathematics, it was by no means a simple matter.
-- Edwin A. Abbot (1884), Flatland
In a recent essay on research traditions in marketing Hermann Simon (1994) of Johnannes
Gutenberg University writes "Over the last decade, we have experienced an increasing
estrangement of academic research from business practice." In the same collection of essays,
Andrew Ehrenberg (1994) of the South Bank Business School in London of writes "Much of the
weightier research literature in marketing can be characterized as (theoretical-in-isolation)." He
suggests that while the bulk of attention has been focused on theory it has accounted for no more
than 20% of the successes. He suggests that empirical-then-theoretical research has accounted
for 80% of the successes. More recently, Patrick Barwise (1995) of the London Business School
opines "the field treats hypothetico-deductive research -- Tbefore E -- as virtually the only true
path. This places it at odds with all the natural sciences." Simon, Ehrenberg, and Barwise are
but three of the many critics calling for more empirical research.
I agree with the need for empirical research, but I am not so pessimistic as these critics.
I feel that there are many excellent empirical researchers in marketing. I have chosen not to
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provide an enumeration for fear of omission. However, I do note that every one of today's
Converse Award winners and discussants has spend substantial time in the field and that every
one has made substantial contributions to practice. And, they are certainly not alone.
Theoretical research has its limits. There will always be propositions that are unprovable
from a finite set of axioms. Gdel's theorem establishes that this is true even for the axioms
of ordinary integer arithmetic. It must certainly be true for the axiomization of complex social
systems. In fact, prior to G6del's theorem "it was tacitly assumed that each sector of
mathematical thought could be supplied with a set of axioms sufficient for developing
systematically the endless totality of true propositions about the given area of inquiry." (Nagel
and Newman 1958). Gdel established that no matter how complex a set of axioms seems to
be, one can always establish a proposition that can neither be proved nor disproved by the
axioms. Thus, no matter how we struggle to explain marketing phenomena with simple axioms
we must always return to the field to observe additional phenomena and, hence, establish new
axioms for further work.
For example, many marketing models attempt to model the equilibrium among actions
by the firm, its competitors, and consumers. In most cases more than one equilibrium is
possible; sometimes infinitely many. A common approach to equilibrium selection is to establish
more and more logical rules that define rationality. Another approach is to study real systems.
I suspect that ten years from now the latter will have proven to be the most productive.
Empirical research is productive, but not everyone does empirical research. I certainly
do not wish to argue that everyone should do empirical research. Philip Kotler's quote tells us
that field research is difficult. The world is a messy place. Managers do not always say what
they mean nor do what they say. Managers may choose successful strategies by instinct or by
luck. However, they are almost always willing to talk to researchers and they always provide
the raw material from which insight might be secured.
Field research is time-consuming. It is easy to make the case for the long-term
contribution of empirical research. But how about the short-term value to the researcher who
is facing a tenure decision in a few years? Does the investment justify the opportunity cost?
I recall an incident two summers ago. I had just interviewed the Chief Executive Officer
at a large research-intensive firm. The purpose of the interview was to determine how he
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managed R&D. As I left I asked him if there was any one question to which he needed an
answer. He said, "How do I protect R&D budgets from my business unit managers?" So I
asked him what would happen to the stock price if the business unit managers had their way.
He said, "It will go up, of course." I left shaking my head. Didn't he understand the efficient
market theory?
It was over a year later before I fully understood his answers and how they relate to the
challenges of establishing a credible value for basic research. What he really was trying to say
was that the long-term value of the firm would go down if he cut basic research but he had not
yet solved the metrics problems. He needed a measure of research productivity upon which to
reward business unit managers so that their incentives for investment in basic research were
compatible with the firm. He also needed a measure which would communicate accurately the
value of basic research to the stockholders. Without such a measure it was rational for them to
be skeptical that the money was well-spent. In many ways his challenges were the similar to
those universities face when evaluating faculty research.
This datum is typical. Field research may not provide immediate value and the value
may not be for the immediate topic. Field research is, in many ways, cumulative. The best
way to reap the value of field research is to maintain a variety of interests and be vigilant to
synergies between experiences. For example, when I examine the work of my colleague Abbie
Griffin I see the tremendous concurrence between her research on quality function deployment,
communication among new product teams, measures of new product effectiveness, cycle time
reduction, and improved customer measurement. Each topic has led to insights into other
investigative areas (as well as enhanced classroom effectiveness).
In my own career I have found that empirical research has provided a significant return
on investment and that the return has fully justified any opportunity cost. But if I were to give
one piece of advise to a beginning assistant professor, I would advise him or her to begin field
research early so that he or she might reap the cumulative rewards.
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The Research Triangle (or Why We Need Both)
... factual and theoretical novelty are (closely) intertwined ... in the sciences fact and theory,
discovery and invention, are not categorically and permanently distinct, ...
-- Thomas S. Kuhn (1970), The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions
By performing painstaking technical analyses of the sentences ordinary people accept as part of
their mother tongue, Chomsky and other linguists developed theories of the mental grammars
underlying people's knowledge ofparticular languages and of the Universal Grammar underlying
the particular grammars.
-- Steven Pinker (1994), The Language Instinct: How the
Mind Creates Language
I have argued that theories come from the crucible of empirical experience and that
empirical research is improved with theory. I think that this duality generalizes. Certainly,
Thomas Kuhn in his history of scientific revolutions believes that they are intertwined.
Similarly, Steven Pinker, in his description of the Chomskian breakthroughs, argues that one of
the most cited theoretical developments emerged from detailed field observations of real people
speaking living languages.'
In the past two years my colleagues and I at the International Center for Research on the
Management of Technology have been studying how corporations evaluate and manage their
research and development investments (R&D). One simple, but powerful, observation is that
R&D is structured into three tiers as illustrated by the conceptual diagram in Figure 1.
Tier 1 is basic research explorations. Activities in tier 1 focus on new science and new
technology and are rarely tied directly to market outcomes. At the other end of the spectrum,
tier 3 focuses on applied research projects with business units. Research in this tier uses science
1Chomsky is one of the ten most cited writers in the humanities, right up there with Shakespeare, the Bible,
Aristotle, Plato, and Freud. See Pinker (1994).
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and technology to solve practical problems and to develop new products. Tier 2 functions as
a bridge by selecting and developing research programs that match (or create) core technological
competence. The system functions such that tier 2 selects those explorations (theories) that
address applied problems and encourages the development of explorations based on the needs
of the business units (empirical applications). Thus we see a duality in corporate R&D as well
as academic research.
In Figure 1 tier 1 represents the smallest effort while tier 3 represents the largest effort
in terms of people and other resources. In university research I suspect that the triangle might
be inverted with greatest emphasis on basic research, but I am not sure. (One might also argue
that the research university places equal emphasis on basic and applied research because research
can only be effective through a combination of rigor and relevance.)
In practice the tiers of R&D are managed and evaluated differently. The value metrics
and management issues vary in emphasis depending upon the tier. Florian Zettelmeyer and I
(1996) have recently completed a formal paper describing what we have learned by studying the
tiers of R&D. In this essay I summarize qualitatively some of the results from that paper and
take a leap of faith by attempting to interpret the implications for academic research. I begin
with tier 3, applied research.
Tier 3. We found that tier 3 research projects could and should be evaluated by business
units. Business units are asked to pay for tier 3 R&D, but subsidies are necessary to align
business unit (managers) incentives with those of the firm. Specifically, these subsidies account
for time preference, risk preference, and research scope. By time and risk preference we
recognize that business unit managers are often more short-term oriented and more risk averse
than the firm. By research scope we refer to the phenomenon that most applied projects lead
to methods and technologies that benefit many projects in a variety of business units The scope
of benefits to the firm is well beyond the benefits to the business unit that funded the project.
We also found that firms recognize the option value of research -- that is, many subsequent
investments are contingent upon the outcomes of initial investments. With tier 3 R&D the firm
buys the option to invest further if and only if that further investment is justified. In fact, some
firms are considering formal "options" theory.
The analogy for academic research is that we can value some components of applied
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research by its impact on practice. However, in calculating that value we must recognize
implications beyond the initial applied research. There may be synergies to other applied
research projects and/or to new theoretical breakthroughs. In academia we must also provide
mechanisms that encourage researchers to take risks and to focus on the long-term. The analogy
to a research subsidy might be that we "overvalue" the successful completion of risky, long-term
inquiries. Perhaps, like industry, we should recognize that a researcher sometimes succeeds by
determining which areas are not worth further investment. Aggregates (the department, the
school, the field) should encourage a variety of research projects and recognize that some
projects are valuable if only to maintain an option for further investigation.
Tier 2. In tier 2 R&D we found a tension between rewards based on market outcomes
and rewards based on effort indicators. To understand this tension, consider how tier 2
performs its functions. R&D managers told us that tier 2 succeeds if it selects the right
programs. The amount of effort allocated to the research program was important, but not as
important as getting the programs right. Tier 2 would first select a program, second allocate
enough effort to determine the magnitude of the program's applicability to the firm, and third
undertake research to advance the program.
Because tier 2 managers and researchers select programs before the scope and value are
known, there is considerable uncertainty in the choice. (They usually have some idea of the
expected benefits, but the variance in benefits is immense.) Because tier 2 makes its program
decisions well in advance of tier 3 projects, any difference in time valuation between tier 2
managers and the firm implies a large difference in the valuation of tier 2 projects. If market
outcomes (sales, profit, percent of revenue due to new products, customer satisfaction, etc.)
weigh heavily in the valuation of tier 2 programs, then risk aversion or short-termism take their
toll. Risk aversion and short-termism cause tier 2 managers (and researchers) to reject falsely
some programs and to avoid high benefit programs that are long-term and risky. In our paper
we illustrate that many programs can fall into these false-rejection and false-selection regions.
To minimize the impact of risk aversion and short-termism the firm would like to avoid
an emphasis on market outcomes. However, the firm can not avoid placing some weight on
market outcomes because, if there is no weight, then there is little incentive for tier 2 managers
to choose high-benefit programs. The net implication appears to be that, to incent the proper
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choice of research programs, tier 2 research programs should be judged on market outcomes,
but the weight on that measure should be small.
But tier 2 does more than just choose research programs. Tier 2 managers and
researchers must be given the right incentives to induce them to allocate the right amount of
resources to the program. This incentive problem is a standard agency theory problem; the
suggested strategy is to weight market outcomes highly. Hence, the tension -- the choice of
research programs requires a small weight on market outcomes but the allocation of research
effort requires a large weight. Corporations finesse this problem by looking for metrics that
correlate with research effort, but do not depend heavily on market outcomes. If these metrics
induce less risk for the researchers and can be observed well in advance of market outcomes,
so much the better. These metrics are the metrics with which we in academia are well familiar -
- publications, citations, patents, citations to patents, and peer review. Tier 2 research is judged
with a small, but not insignificant, weight on market outcomes and a higher weight on
publications, citations, patents, citations to patents, and peer review.
I make the obvious analogy to academic research. Publications, citations, and peer
review are not so bad. (Patents are rare in marketing science research.) By evaluating faculty
on these metrics we provide incentives to allocate the "optimal" research effort. However, we
must also place some weight, albeit a smaller weight, on market outcomes. The recent trend
towards placing higher values on teaching performance is just one manifestation of this need for
market-outcome metrics. We should consider the relevancy and scope of faculty research.
Industry impact should be encouraged and rewarded. I have seen no systematic study of the
tenure-review processes at business schools, but the trends at M.I.T. are consistent with these
interpretations.
Tier 1. This is the tier that is probably closest to the heart of most faculty researchers.
Tier 1 is even further from market outcomes than tier 2, hence publications, citations, and peer
review are even more critical. But we can learn two additional lessons from corporate R&D --
portfolio management and research spillovers.
Tier 1 is managed for its research portfolio. The value to the firm of a tier 1 research
portfolio is the value of the best outcomes, not the average outcomes. To maximize the
maximum value, firms manage their tier 1 portfolio for high variance and for negative
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correlation among projects. For academic research this implies we should be eclectic in our
approaches, take risks, and be tolerant of approaches that are different that the ones we favor.
Avoiding false rejection should be a high priority for academic research. A journal can survive
false acceptance, but I am not sure the field can survive the false rejection of ideas.
Tier 1 is also managed to take advantage of research spillovers. By a research spillover
I mean research that is done at another firm or in another industry which, if recognized by the
recipient firm, can solve a critical research problem. Two characteristics of research spillovers
are important. First, the impact of research spillovers is significant and, second, the more a
firm invests in its own research the better it is able to take advantage of spillovers. While the
direct effect of competitive R&D is negative (when competitors spend more they improve their
products and this hurts you), the indirect effect through spillovers is positive (when competitors
spend more you get more research spillovers). In fact, for large firms Jaffe (1986) suggests that
the spillover effect of competitive R&D might actually be larger than the direct competitive
effect. Spillovers are also important within a firm because research in one discipline (e.g.,
biology) provides value to another discipline (e.g., pharmacology). See Henderson and
Cockburn (1994).
The importance of research spillovers suggests that firms should encourage tier 1
researchers to take advantage of potential ideas that originate outside the firm. In terms of a
reward system this means that tier 1 should reward researchers both for ideas that they originate
and for ideas they bring to the firm from other sources.
However, this, too, provides a tension. Because basic research is so removed from
market outcomes it is extremely difficult to evaluate people. Hence, to retain and support
proven researchers, many firms attempt to identify the best people and institute "research fellow"
systems that are not unlike university tenure systems. It is tempting to identify the "best" people
by their original research rather than by spillover identification. We have analyzed this situation
with simple agency theory models. Our results suggest that a focus on original research leads
directly to (1) "not invented here (NIH)" attitudes, (2) research empires of too many internal
projects, and (3) fewer total ideas available to the firm.
Academic tenure does reward past performance and helps to retain and support proven
researchers. However, we must be careful that our reward system does not to institute an NIH
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bias. We should reward and encourage "arbitrage" from other fields and from other researchers
(with appropriate attribution).2 We are all better off when we learn from one another.
I am also persuaded by Henderson and Cockburn's research on interdisciplinary
spillovers. They suggest that there are economies of scale to concentration (enough critical mass
in a discipline) but economies of scope across disciplines. My interpretation is that we benefit
from a multiplicity of perspectives and approaches in the marketing sciences. An ideal
department should have critical mass in a variety of disciplines and in a variety of application
domains.
2I find it curious that I am best known outside of marketing for an article (with Don Clausing) on the "House of
Quality." It has sold over 128,000 reprints. In that article Don and I simply described an emerging product development
practice. That's a research spillover from which I have benefitted!
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Emerging Topics in Marketing Science (Product Development)
... no final account can be given in the precise logical form of valid mathematical
demonstrations.
-- Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman (1958), Godel's Proof
It is clear that there is no unique method or formula for (the) discovery ...
Frank M. Bass and Jerry Wind (1995), in Marketing
Science
Throughout the past twenty years we have seen tremendous advances in research on
product development. Product development is now more efficient and effective. We listen to
the customer earlier in the process and we know how to ask the right questions. We analyze
the data with powerful methods driven by advances in stochastic models, scaling methods,
conjoint analysis, pretest markets, and prelaunch forecasting. We make recommendations based
on optimization methods, (gaming) models of competitive response, and agency theory. We
know about quality tools, concurrent engineering, cross functional teams, design for manufacture
and assembly, computer-aided design, rapid prototyping, supply chain management, and
information acceleration. We have advanced the state-of-the-art in segmentation, differentiation,
advertising, and promotion. Fewer products fail, fewer resources are spent on failed products,
and successful products are better-designed. As a field we can take pride in these
accomplishments.
However, I agree with the opening quote by Cooper and Kleinschmidt that product
development is an ongoing challenge. All of the methods that I have mentioned from stochastic
models to game theory are now required in most Ph.D. programs and have even made their way
into MBA programs. Tomorrow's product-development researchers will have to know all of
these methods and know them well. This will be their ticket of entry. There will be many
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advances in these methods, but I believe that the true paradigm shifts will begin from field-based
problems. The best way to identify emerging topics and to define "hot" research areas is to look
to practice. We must not rely on our current models (nor treat them as doctrine). Rather we
may have to discard our current paradigms and adopt new ones.
I am not so fool hardy as to predict all of the challenges, but I am aware of a few.
The area of metrics is clearly important. People respond to what is measured. Product
developers are creative people. They respond creatively to metrics and incentive systems. With
the right incentive systems they act in the firm's best interests, but the wrong incentive systems
lead to counterproductive behavior. Griffin and Page (1995) and Griffin (1995) have
demonstrated these phenomena for both product-development success metrics and for product-
development cycle-time metrics. I hope that I have convinced you that it is true for R&D
metrics. However, the study of metrics is more than a simple agency-theory problem. Real
product-development teams are complex and multi-faceted, product development is a complex
task, and product development takes place in a complex environment. It is difficult to isolate
the effect of any one metric or for any one actor and the long-term effects (feedback loops) may
differ from the direct effects. Today's agency theory is a powerful paradigm, but we may need
a new paradigm to make significant progress. Hopefully, such a complex-team agency theory
will emerge.
Design complexity is another important topic. Today's products are complex and
growing more complex. The design of the Boeing 777 required 100 million design decisions.
Even in an automobile there are over 2-3 kilometers of wiring connecting an extensive network
of sensors, switches, motors, and computers.3 Even seemingly simple products such as kitchen
appliances now contain integrated circuits that allow them to react to user needs and to monitor
usage (and their own reliability). There are clear challenges in managing use and reuse of parts,
the hierarchical structure of teams, the architectures that define product platforms, and many of
the other issues driven by complexity. Such themes may seem closer to engineering than
3The aircraft example is due to Warren Seering of M.I.T. Of those 100 million, only 100,000 were "hard" in the
sense that the rest followed from the initial 100,000. But 100,000 design decisions is still an immense engineering
challenge. The automobile wiring example is due to Mr. Takahiro Oikawa of Yazaki Corporation. Mr. Oikawa points
out that this is the end result of a successful effort by Yazaki to reduce significantly the length and weight of the wiring.
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marketing, but, in practice, these roles are being merged. Perhaps they should be merged in
academia as well.
A third topic is the explosion of information. The Internet is just one demonstration of
what is happening as more information is made available to more people. Communication has
always proven critical to product development (Allen 1978). Information technology has made
it feasible for remote team members to play active roles in cross-functional product-development
teams. Technologies make it possible to monitor consumer usage and to communicate more
easily with existing consumers. New media enable consumers to obtain data more easily on
product performance, availability, and price. Such reduced information-search costs might lead
to larger consideration sets which, in turn, will affect competitive structures. Software "agents,"
or other intermediaries, may emerge to serve consumers and/or manufacturers? This will affect
the distribution and supply systems. Even our own education systems will be changed by
"distance learning." To participate in these revolutions academia must study and plan for the
structural changes induced by the information revolution.
There are other trends, including globalization of competition and demand, cradle-to-
grave product planning, the need for environmental planning, virtual prototyping, virtual-
customer decision support systems, and the virtual corporation, but I am confident that we will
make progress on them all. I have always been optimistic about the ultimate impact of academic
research and I remain so today.
_ ________ 
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Some Thanks
I would like to close this essay with some thanks to my colleagues throughout the years.
I began my academic career as an engineer working on dial-a-ride bus systems. (In fact, my
first paper was on routing algorithms.) Despite our best efforts, ridership was low on an
experimental system. As the most junior person in algorithm development, the task fell to me
to complete a market survey to find out why. We surveyed consumers, found a fundamental
flaw in the objective function, changed the algorithm, and ridership improved dramatically. A
little marketing research did more for that project than many long hours at a computer terminal!
I was impressed and I never looked back. I went to John Little (then head of the Operations
Research Center at M.I.T.), he introduced me to Glen Urban, and so began a long career in
marketing.
For the past twenty years I have gone to John and Glen for advice and it has always
proven valuable. I have collaborated with Glen on many a paper and two books and, in each
case, I have enjoyed the experience, learned valuable lessons, and have come to appreciate his
insight, creativity, and capabilities. I have co-authored but one paper with John, but that comes
no where near indicating my debt to him.
I have asked two of my former students, now recognized researchers, to comment today.
I have enjoyed working with each and can not begin to express what I have learned from them.
I want also to thank my other co-authors (in alphabetical order) Jon Bohlmann, Roberta Chicos,
Don Clausing, Josh Eliashberg, Pete Fader, Steve Gaskin, Phil Johnson, Bob Klein, Frank
Koppelman, Leonard Lodish, John Roberts, Bill Qualls, Duncan Simester, Patricia Simmie,
Peter Stopher, Derby Swanson, Alice Tybout, Bruce Weinberg, Birger Wernerfelt, Nigel
Wilson, Ken Wisniewski, and Florian Zettelmeyer. I wish that I had the space to write an essay
about each one. And these people are but a small fraction of the colleagues who have influenced
and supported me and to whom I wish to express my thanks.
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Applied Development of Research Projects
either Jointly with Business Units or at the
Request of Business Units
Figure 1. Tiers of R&D
(from Hauser and Zettelmeyer 1996)
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